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Abstract  
In Ciphertext Policy Attribute based Encryption scheme, the encryptor can fix the policy, who 
can decrypt the encrypted message. The policy can be formed with the help of attributes. In 
CP-ABE, access policy is sent along with the ciphertext. We propose a method  in which the 
access policy need not be sent along with the ciphertext, by which we are able to preserve the 
privacy of the encryptor. The proposed construction is provably secure under Decision 
Bilinear Diffe-Hellman assumption. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
Recently, much attention has been attracted by a new public key primitive called 
Attribute-based encryption (ABE). ABE has significant advantage over the 
traditional PKC primitives as it achieves flexible one-to-many encryption instead of 
one-to-one. ABE is envisioned as an important tool for addressing the problem of 
secure and fine-grained data sharing and access control. In an ABE system, a user is 
identified by a set of attributes. In their seminal paper Sahai and Waters [6] use 
biometric measurements as attributes in the following way. A secret key based on a 
set of attributes ω, can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with a public key based on a 
set of attributes ω’, only if the sets ω and ω’ overlap sufficiently as determined by a 
threshold value t.  A party could encrypt a document to all users who have certain set 
of attributes drawn from a pre-defined attribute universe. For example, one can 
encrypt a blood group wanted document to all donors of that specific blood group 
from a particular locality of specific age group. In this case the document would be 
encrypted to the attribute subset {“B+”, “Karaikudi”, “Age 20-25”}, and only users 
with all of these three attributes in the blood bank can hold the corresponding private 
keys and thus decrypt the document, while others cannot.    
   There are two variants of ABE: Key-Policy based ABE (KP-ABE) [5] and 
Ciphertext Policy based ABE(CP-ABE) [1,2,3,4]. In KP-ABE, the ciphertext is 
associated with a set of attributes and the secret key is associated with the access 
policy. The encryptor defines the set of descriptive attributes necessary to decrypt 
the ciphertext. The trusted authority who generates user’s secret key defines the 
combination of attributes for which the secret key can be used. In CP-ABE, the idea 
is reversed: now the ciphertext is associated with the access policy and the 
encrypting party determines the policy under which the data can be decrypted, while 
the secret key is associated with a set of attributes.  
Besides fine-grained access policy, there is an increasing need to protect user 
privacy in today’s access control systems. In some critical circumstances, the access 
policy itself could be sensitive information. Therefore, we propose an attribute –
based encryption scheme where encryptor specified access policies are hidden. Even 
the legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the access policy 
associated with the encrypted data more than the fact that she can decrypt the data. 
 Our Contribution  
We present a scheme for constructing a Ciphertext Policy Attribute based 
Encryption with hidden access policy and provide security under the Decisional 
Diffie-Hellman assumption. In our scheme access policy can be expressed using 
AND, OR boolean operators, so that it is possible to express the access policy 
effectively. Each attribute ai in the access policy can take multiple values. The access 
policy can be represented by an n-ary tree, the leaf nodes represents the attribute 
present in the access policy, interior nodes represents the AND, OR operators. Each 
attribute in the leaf node can take multiple values. The value assigned for the leaf 
node by the secret sharing method will be distributed to these multiple values. In our 
scheme, it is not necessary to put all the attributes in the access policy. 
Related Work 
 Since the introduction of ABE in implementing fine-grained access control systems, 
a lot of works have been proposed to design flexible ABE schemes. There are two 
methods to realize the fine-grained access control based on ABE: KP-ABE and CP-
ABE.  They were both mentioned in [4] by Goyal et al. In KP-ABE, each attribute 
private key is associated with an access structure that specifies which type of 
ciphertexts the key is able to decrypt, and ciphertext is labeled with sets of attributes.  
In a CP-ABE system, a user’s key is associated with a set of attributes and an 
ecrypted ciphertext will specify an access policy over attributes. The first KP-ABE 
construction [4] realized the monotonic access structures for key policies. 
Bethencourt et al. [2] proposed the first CP-ABE construction.  The construction [2] 
is only proved secure under the generic group model. To overcome this weakness, 
Cheung and Newport [3] presented another construction that is proved to be secure 
under the standard model. To achieve receiver-anonymity, Boneh and Waters [10] 
proposed a predicate encryption scheme based on the primitive called Hidden Vector 
Encryption.  
 
          
 The first Anonymous Ciphertext policy Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) 
construction was introduced by Nishide et al. [7]. They gave two CP-ABE schemes 
with partially hidden ciphertext policies in the sense that possible values of each 
attribute in the system should be known to an encryptor in advance and the encryptor 
can hide what subset of possible values for each attribute in the ciphertext policy can 
be used for successful decryption. The policy can be expressed as AND gates on 
multi valued attributes with wild cards. They describe their constructions in the 
multi-valued attribute setting where an attribute can take multiple values. The 
legitimate decryptor cannot obtain the information about the ciphertext policy. The 
Second construction was proposed by Keita Emura et al. [8] focusing Key 
anonymity with respect to the authority. In this model, even if an adversary has the 
master key, the adversary cannot guess what identity is associated with the 
ciphertext. The access structure used in their scheme is restricted to an AND gate 
only.  Third construction was proposed by Jin li et al.[9] gave accountable, 
anonymous Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption. This is achieved by binding 
users identity in the attribute private key. They gave two constructions, one with 
short public parameters and the other with short ciphertext. They use two different 
generators to prevent the public verifiability of the ciphertext validity, which 
achieves hidden policy. In this method also the access structure can be specified as 
AND gate of multi valued attributes.  
2   PRELIMINARIES 
2.1   Bilinear Maps 
Let G
 
and G1be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a 
generator of G
 
and e be a bilinear map, e : G x G → G1 .  The bilinear map e has the 
following properties: 
                       1.Bilinearity : for all u,v ∈ 
  
G
 
and a,b  ∈ Zp   , we have  
                          e (u a, vb) = e(u,v)ab 
                       2.Non-degeneracy : e(g,g) ≠ 1. 
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation in G
 
and bilinear map     
e : G x G → G1  are both efficiently computable. Notice that the map e is symmetric 
since   e (g a, gb) = e(g,g)ab = e (g b, ga). 
Decisional  Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption 
A challenger chooses a group G of prime order p according to the security 
parameter. Let a,b,c ∈  Zp be chosen at  random and g be a generator G. The 
adversary when given (g, ga,gb, gc ) must distinguish a valid tuple e(g,g)abc ∈ G1 
from a random element R in G1. 
An algorithm A that outputs {0,1} has advantage Є in solving decisional BDH if  
│Pr[A (g, ga,gb,gc , D=e(g,g)abc )= 0 ] – Pr[A (g, ga,gb,gc  ,D=R ) = 0] │≥ Є 
Definition 1 The DBDH assumption holds if no polytime algorithm has a  non-
negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem. 
 
 
2.2    Access structure 
Definition 2 Let U ={ a1,a2,..,an} be a set of attributes. For ai  ∈ U, Si = { vi,1, v 
i,2,…, 
iniv , } is a set of possible values, where ni is the number of possible values for 
ai . Let L = [L1, L2,..,Ln] Li  ∈ Si be an attribute list for a user, and  W = [W1, 
W2,..,Wn]  Wi  ε Si be an access policy. The notation L ╞ W express that an attribute 
list L satisfies an access policy W, namely Li = Wi (i=1,2..,n). The notation L ╫ 
W implies L not satisfying the access structure W. 
2.3    Ciphertext Policy Attribute based Encryption  
A cipher text policy attribute based encryption scheme consists of four fundamental 
algorithms: Setup, Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption. 
 
Setup: The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit security parameter. 
It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK. 
Key Generation (MK,S): The key generation algorithm takes as input the master 
key MK and a set of attributes S that describe the key. It outputs a private key SK. 
Encrypt (PK,A, M): The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters 
PK, a message M, and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. The 
algorithm will encrypt M and produce a ciphertext CT such that only a user that 
possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure will be able to decrypt 
the message. Assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains A. 
Decrypt(PK,CT,SK): The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters 
PK, a ciphertext  CT, which contains an access policy A, and a private key SK, 
which is a private key for a set S of attributes. If the set S of attributes satisfies the 
access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a 
message M. 
 
2.4    Security Model for CP-ABE 
Init. The adversary sends the two different challenge access structures *0W and 
*
1W  to the challenger. 
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters, PK 
to the adversary. 
Phase 1. The adversary sends an attribute list L to the challenger for a Key Gen  
query, where (L ╫ *0W    and  L ╫  *1W     ) or (L  ╞ *0W  and  L  ╞   *1W   )  The 
challenger answers with a secret key for these attributes.  
Challenge.  The adversary submits two equal length messages M0    and M1.    
Note that if the adversary has obtained SKL where (L ╞ *0W and L  ╞  *1W ) then 
M0 = M1. The challenger chooses d randomly from {0,1} and runs Encrypt(PK, Md, 
*
dW ). The challenger gives the ciphertext CT* to the adversary. 
Phase 2.  Same as Phase 1. 
Guess.  The adversary outputs a guess d’ of d. 
  The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[d’=d] -
2
1
. 
Definition 3  A ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme is secure if all 
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game. 
 
3   CONSTRUCTION 
Proposed solution consists of 4 phases, Setup Phase, Key Generation Phase, 
Encryption Phase and   Decryption Phase. 
Set Up: 
The setup algorithm chooses a group G
 
of prime order p and a generator g . 
Step 1:   A trusted authority generates a tuple G=[p,G,G1,g ∈  G, e]  ⃖  Gen(1k) . 
Step 2:   For each attribute ai where 1 ≤i ≤n, the authority    generates random value 
{ai,t ∈  *pZ } 1 ≤t ≤ni and computes {T i,t = tiag ,  } 1 ≤t ≤ni  
Step 3: Compute Y = e(g,g)α where α ∈  *pZ  
Step 4:  The public key PK consists of [Y,p,G,G1 ,e ,{{T i,t } 1 ≤t ≤ni }1 ≤i ≤n] 
  
   The master key Mk is [α, {{ai,t ∈ *pZ } 1 ≤t ≤ni} 1 ≤i ≤n] 
 
Key Generation (MK,L): The  Key Generation algorithm takes master key MK 
and the attribute list of the user as input and do  the following 
Let L=[L1,L2,…,Ln]={
ntntt
vvv
,,2,1 ,..,, 21
}  be the attribute list for the user who obtain 
the corresponding secret key. 
Step1:  The trusted authority picks up random values λi ∈ *pZ  for 1 ≤i ≤n &  
r ∈  *pZ and computes  D0= g 
α –r
. 
Step2:  For 1 ≤i ≤n  the authority also computes D i,1 , D i,2 = [ tii arg ,λ+  , ig λ ] where 
Li = itiv ,   The secret key is [D0 Di,1 , Di,2 ]. 
 
Encrypt(PK,M,W):  An encryptor encrypts a message M∈  G1 under a cipher text 
policy W=[w1,w2,..,wn] and proceed as follows. 
Step1 : Select  s ∈ *pZ and compute C0=g 
s
 and C~ = M. Ys = M.e(g,g)αs  
Step2: Set the root node of W to be s, mark all child nodes as un-assigned,  
           and mark the root node assigned. 
                          
Recursively, for each un-assigned non leaf node , do the following 
 
a) If the symbol is /\ and its child nodes are unassigned , we assign a random value 
si, 1 ≤si ≤p-1 and to the last child node assign the value 
       psss
t
i
it mod
1
1
∑
−
=
−= . Mark this node assigned. 
b) If the symbol is \/, set the values of each  node to be s. Mark this node assigned. 
c) Each leaf attribute ai ,can take any possible multi  values, the value of the share si 
is distributed to those values and  compute 
 [Ci,t,1 , Ci,t,2 ]= [ isg , istiT , ]. The cipher text CT is 
         [C~,C0 ,  {{  Ci,t,1 , Ci,t,2 } 1 ≤t ≤ni } 1 ≤i ≤n }]. 
 
 
Decryption (CT,SKL): 
 
    The recipient tries  to decrypt  CT, without  knowing  the access policy W by 
using his SKL  associated with the attribute list L as follows 
 
    
 
 
       M = 
 
        
 
4    SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Theorem  : The anonymous  CP-ABE construction is secure under the  DBDH  
assumption. 
 
Proof: 
         We assume that the adversary A has non-negligible advantage Є to break the 
privacy of our scheme.   
          Then we can construct an algorithm B that breaks that DBDH assumption with 
the probability Є 
           Let (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) be a DBDH instance. 
Init.  The adversary A gives   B the challenge access structure  *0W  and  
*
1W . B 
chooses d randomly from the set { 0, 1} . 
 Setup.   To provide  a public key PK to A ,   B  sets  Y=e(g,g)ab, implies      α= ab. 
Choose jia ,' R∈  
*
pZ  ( i∈  [1,n], j∈  [1,ni])and computes jiaji gT ,
'
,
=  
       
 
The simulator, B sends the public parameters (e,g, Y, {{ jiT , } 1≤j ≤ni } 1≤  i  ≤n to A. 
Phase 1. A submits an attribute list L = [L1, L2, …, Ln] in a secret key query. We 
consider only the case where (L ╫ *0W    and  L ╫  *1W     ) . 
∏
∏
=
=
n
i
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For KeyGen query L, B choose βi, jia ,'  ∈  *pZ   and set ii βλ =  , r = ab- βi jia ,'  and 
computes the secret keys as follows 
                                        
                   D0      = 
rg −α
 
                                                    = 
))(( '
, jiiaababg β−−  
                                                    =  
jii ag ,
'β
    
                                        1,kD     = 
tiiarg ,λ+
 
                                                    = 
tiijii aaabg ,,
' λβ +−
 
                                                    =  
αg
 
                                        
ii ggDk
βλ
==2,  
                              
Challenge. A submits two messages M0, M1 ∈ G1    if  M0 = M1, B simply aborts and 
takes a random guess . The simulator flips a fair binary coin d, and returns the 
encryption of Md. The encryption of Md can be done as follows: 
 
       C0 = gc    , C ~= Md e(g,g)αc  = Md Z. 
 
B generates, for wd,  the ciphertext components {{  Ci,t,1 , Ci,t,2 } 1 ≤t ≤ni } 1 ≤i ≤n  as 
follows 
Set the root node of W to be c, mark all child nodes as un-assigned,  and mark the 
root node assigned. 
                          
Recursively, for each un-assigned non leaf node , do the following  
 
a) If the symbol is /\ and its child nodes are unassigned, we assign a random value hi  
1 ≤hi ≤p-1 and to the last child node assign the value 
∑
−
=
= 1
1
t
i
i
t
h
ch .  Mark this node assigned. 
b) If the symbol is ∨, set the values of each  node to be c. Mark this node assigned. 
Each leaf attribute wi ,can take any possible multi  values, the value of the share si is 
distributed to those values and  compute 
 [Ci,t,1 , Ci,t,2 ]= [ ihg , ihjiT , ].  
 
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1. 
 
Guess.   From the above considerations,  the adversary  can decide that  Z = e(g,g)abc  
when d = d’  and can decide that Z ∈R G1   otherwise. Therefore A  breaks the DBDH 
problem with the probability Є. □      
                                                                                                            
5    CONCLUSION 
We proposed an Attribute based encryption which preserves the privacy of the 
access policy, specified by the encryptor. This scheme is very expressive and 
provably secure under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. 
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